Formulating a dynamic game model of a world exhaustible resource market, this paper studies welfare implications of Stackelberg leaderships for an individual country and the world. We overcome the problem of time-inconsistency by imposing a "credibility condition" on the Markovian strategy of the Stackelberg leader. Under this condition, we show that the presence of a global Stackelberg leader leaves the follower worse off relative to the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the world welfare is highest in the Nash equilibrium as compared with the two Stackelberg equilibria.
Introduction
International trade in vital inputs such as oil and natural gas is a major concern for resource-poor and resource-rich economies. Reflecting this fact, World Trade Report of the WTO [31] that focuses on trade in natural resources points out that "natural resources represent a significant and growing share of world trade and amounted to some 24 per cent of total merchandise trade in 2008" (p. 40). It is obvious that fluctuations in prices and quantities of these resources can heavily affect the economic performance and welfare of individual countries as well as the global economy. 1 Considering the contemporary world market of natural resources, Karp and Newbery [10, p. 303] drew attention to two salient characteristics. First, a small group of buyers has a substantial share of the world demand, while a small group of sellers control much of the world supply, allowing them to exercise market power. 2
The world market for oil and gas is dominated by Russia and OPEC countries as major suppliers, while the United States, Japan and China account for much of the world imports. The second feature is that all natural resources are potentially exhaustible and therefore a careful analysis should take into account consideration of both flows and stocks. This paper formulates a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource, paying special attention to the welfare implications of leaderships.
There is a large theoretical literature on the exercise of market power in the trading relationship between a resource-poor country and a resource-rich country. Broadly, this literature consists of three groups of models. The first group is characterized by the assumption that the resource-exporting country exercises its market power while the importing country is passive. 3 The second one considers the opposite scenario: the importing country imposes 1 Blanchard and Gali [5] empirically consider the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks.
2 According to the 2008 data of the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 67% of oil exports come from the OPEC countries while the United States and Japan account for 33% and 14% shares of oil imports, respectively.
3 See Kemp and Long [13] and a survey by Long [18] . a tariff to shift resource rents away from passive foreign resource owners. 4 The third one deals with the case of bilateral monopoly: both the importing and exporting countries realize that they have market power and behave strategically. 5 This paper belongs to the third group, but we probe more deeply into the issue of leadership.
In modeling leaderships in a dynamic game, three solution concepts have been defined in the literature. The first is an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium in which both the leader and follower use strategies that specify their actions as functions of time alone. 6 As shown by Kemp and Long [14] , this solution concept is vulnerable to the problem of time inconsistency: the leader is tempted to deviate from the predetermined path strategy in later periods.
The second is called a global Stackelberg equilibrium where the leader announces a stock-dependent (i.e. Markovian) decision rule at the beginning of the game and then the follower chooses a stock-dependent decision rule, taking the leader's rule as given. As is true of the open-loop solution, this equilibrium is also generally time inconsistent. 7 The third solution concept is a stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium in which no precommitment of any significant length is allowed for either player: the leader can only determines the stock-dependent decision rule just prior to the follower's choice in each period. 8 By definition, the solution is time consistent since no player precommits. Rubio [24] and Rubio and Escriche [25] compute the stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium in a set-up similar to ours, finding that the Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the Nash equilibrium when the exporting 4 See Kemp and Long [14] , Bergstrom [4] , Brander and Djajic [6] , Karp [9] , Maskin and Newbery [21] , and Karp and Newbery [10, 11, 12] . 5 This group includes Karp [9] , Wirl [29] , Wirl and Dockner [30] , Tahvonen [28] , Rubio and Escriche [25] , Liski and Tahvonen [17] , Rubio [24] , and Chou and Long [7] . 6 To adopt the terminology of Reinganum and Stokey [23] , open-loop strategies are "path strategies," which they distinguish from "decision rule strategies" or Markovian strategies. 7 Long and Sorger [20] discuss this issue. They point out that the global feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is "generically not time-consistent." 8 The concepts of 'global Stackelberg equilibrium' and 'stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium' were discussed in Mehlmann [22] and Basar and Olsder [1] . For examples of these equilibria, see Long [18] . country is a leader.
In this paper, we consider global Stackelberg equilibria in a resource market, and impose a time-consistency requirement which effectively restricts the set of strategies that a leader can choose. We characterize a global Stackelberg equilibrium in linear strategies where the importing country leads, and one where the exporting country leads. We compare the resulting welfare levels with the Nash equilibrium welfare. In deriving these equilibria, we propose a condition called " credibility condition" that guarantees time consistency of the global Stackelberg equilibrium.
Our reasons for paying special attention to the global Stackelberg equilibrium are as follows. First, there is no compelling reason to prefer the stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium to the global one if time inconsistency is overcome. As mentioned above, we will show that the global Stackelberg equilibrium can be time consistent by imposing a time consistency condition. Thus, it makes sense to consider some implications of the global solution. Second, this solution concept has been successfully adopted in the literature, mainly in the field of taxation, e.g., Kemp, Long and Shimomura [15] , Long and Shimomura [19] , Benchekroun and Long [2] , and Benchekroun et al. [3] . 9 Therefore, it is of some interest to find out what one can infer from the global solution, in contrast to the stagewise solution. Finally, it has been argued that some degree of precommitment by the leader can be observed. Among others, OPEC serves as a precommitment device to extract oil rents. 10 In this respect, the case of the leader's precommitment is worth addressing. We will demonstrate that the coincidence of the Nash equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium under the exporter's leadership is no longer valid under the global solution. And, by using numerical examples, we will establish that the world welfare is highest in the Nash equilibrium and lowest under the leadership of the importing country.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model and the 9 Chapter 5 in Dockner et al. [8] provides both a theory and economic applications of the global Stackelberg equilibrium. 10 See, for example, Kohl [16] . 
The Basic Model
This section presents our basic model and the feedback Nash equilibrium as a benchmark for comparison with global Stackelberg equilibria. 11 There are two countries, a resource-importing country (Home) and a resource-exporting country (Foreign). All the Foreign variables are distinguished from the Home variables by attaching an asterisk (*). Foreign does not consume the resource good. 12 Home imposes a specific tariff on its imports. Foreign has a stock of resource X. We assume that the extraction cost per unit increases as the stock dwindles. This can be easily pictured by thinking of a cylinder-shaped mine. The surface area of the mine is unity by normalization, so the depth at which the last unit of resource can be found is X. The marginal cost of extraction increases with the depth of the mine. Denote by q(t) the rate of extraction and by S(t) the depth reached at time t, where :Ṡ(t) = q(t). We assume that at any time, the cost of extracting q is cSq, i.e., the marginal cost of extraction is cS. 13 Thus, the deeper one has to go down, the higher is the marginal cost.
Home's inverse demand function of the resource good is
where p c is the price which the consumers have to pay per unit. The parameter a is called the 'choke price.' It is the marginal utility of consuming 11 For a detailed derivation of the Nash equilibrium reported below, see Chou and Long [7] . 12 For a model where Foreign also consumes the resource good, see Brander and Djajic [6] . 13 In what follows, we suppress the time argument t unless confusion arises.
the first unit. Let S denote the depth at which the marginal extraction cost equals the choke price, i.e., cS = a. We assume that X is larger than S.
Then, efficiency implies that the resource stock be abandoned as soon as the depth S reaches its critical level S = a/c, i.e., before physical exhaustion of the stock. 14 Let τ be a per unit tariff levied on imported resources. Then, the consumer price of Home is
where p(t) is the price posted at time t by the exporting country which uses a Markovian decision rule p = p(S). 15 From (1) and (2), the Home demand is given by q = a − p − τ , from which the resource dynamics iṡ
Taking equation (3) as a constraint, Home chooses a time profile of tariffs to maximize the discounted stream of the sum of consumer surplus and tariff revenue:
where r > 0 is a constant rate of discount. Note that since this section deals with the Nash equilibrium, in solving this problem, we assume that Home takes Foreign's decision rule p(S) as given. In a parallel way, Foreign chooses a time profile of producer prices to maximize the discounted stream of profits:
where τ (S) is Home's decision rule for its tariff rate.
14 This formulation was used in Karp [9] . It has been extended to the case of oligopoly by Salo and Tahvonen [26] . In a recent exposition of the state of the oil market, Smith [27, p. 147 ] pointed out that "most of the oil in any given deposit will never be produced, and therefore does not count as proved reserves, because it would be too costly to effect complete recovery." This indicates that the "exhaustion" of a deposit should be interpreted as an "economic abandonment" of the deposit after the profitable part has been exploited. 15 Note that at the moment p(S) is in principle any arbitrary decision rule: it maps the state variable S(t) to the posted price p(t). Only after the equilibrium pair of decision rules is found can one use the equilibrium function p(S) to predict the price.
Since this is a typical linear-quadratic game, it is straightforward to characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium. In particular, Chou and Long [7] find the feedback Nash equilibrium in linear strategies:
where µ is the positive root of the quadratic equation (3/4)µ 2 + rµ − cr = 0, i.e., µ = 2 (r 2 + 3cr) 1/2 − r /3. And, the value function of Home V (S) is
for all S in the interval 0, a c . Finally, in the Nash equilibrium, the value function of Foreign is V * (S) = 2V (S). Notice that the Nash equilibrium pair decision rules (τ (S), p(S)) displays an attractive feature: as S approaches the abandonment level S = a/c, (i) the tariff rate falls gradually to zero, and (ii) the posted price p rises gradually to the choke price a.
Remark 1 The time path of the stock is
The feedback Nash equilibrium gives a reference point in the comparison with Stackelberg equilibria. In particular, it is useful to find the welfare level of each country under S = 0:
This completes the description of the Nash equilibrium. The subsequent sections derive the global Stackelberg equilibria in this model.
Global Stackelberg Equilibrium with the Importer's Leadership
To find the global Stackelberg equilibrium in which Home is a leader, we suppose that it announces a linear tariff rule τ (S) = αS + β at the beginning of the game. To determine the leader optimal pair (α, β) we must first solve for the follower's reaction function: how does the follower's strategy depend on any arbitrary pair (α, β). Thus, taking (α, β) as given, Foreign's best reply must satisfy the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
where V * (S) is Foreign's value function and V * S (S) ≡ dV * (S)/dS. Inverting the first-order condition for maximizing the right-hand side yields Foreign's strategy:
where V * S (S) is to be determined. Given the linear-quadratic game, it is plausible to guess that V * (S) is quadratic:
where A * , B * and C * are undetermined coefficients to be endogenously derived. Eq. (8) immediately leads to V * S (S) = A * S + B * and the above strategy is rewritten as
Substituting these results into (8), we have an identity in S:
Equating the coefficients of S 2 and S, and of the constant term on the lefthand side with those on the right-hand side, we have
Solving the first equation for A * yields 16
Substituting (9) into the resource dynamics leads tȯ
Therefore, in order to guarantee asymptotic stability, we require that (A * − α − c) < 0. As a result, A * is determined as
Using (10), we obtain
Substituting (11) into the equation for C * , we get
Finally, substituting (10) and (11) into (9), the exporter's strategy takes a form
We see from this equation that α * depends on α and β * depends on both α and β. In this sense, p(S) is the follower's reaction function. Given τ (S), the function p(S) is determined. The resulting price that consumers in Home face can then be expressed as a function of the state variable S :
The function (14) Lemma 1 When Home is the leader, the credibility condition (15) is satisfied if and only if its choice of (α, β) satisfies the condition that
Having described the follower's behavior, let us turn to the leader's problem. To this end, substituting (13) into (3), the resource dynamics under linear strategies isṠ
the solution of which is
The instantaneous welfare of Home under linear strategies τ (S) = αS + β
Substituting the above solution of S, and α * and β * in (13) into this felicity function and rearranging terms, we obtain
Taking the integral of this function, Home's payoff from any state-date pair
At time t = 0 Home chooses α and β to maximize (17) with (S , t ) = (S 0 , 0).
Therefore, α and β are obtained by solving the first-order conditions by differentiating the right-hand side of (17)-evaluated at (S , t ) = (S 0 , 0)-with respect to α and β. However, the resulting solutions for α and β inevitably depend on S 0 . This implies that if Home is allowed to reoptimize at any time t 1 > 0, the optimal value of α and β becomes a function of S(t 1 ) which is generally different from α and β that depend on S 0 . In other words, α and β determined at time 0 are no longer optimal at time t 1 , i.e., they are time inconsistent.
One way to overcome this difficulty is to impose the restriction that αa + βc = 0. This restriction will ensure that the derivative of the equilibrium payoff function (17) with respect to the parameters of the tariff function be independent of stock levels, for all non-negative stock levels. We will call this condition a "time consistency" condition. The economic meaning of this restriction is that when S = S, Home's payoff is zero, as the term inside the square brackets in (17) is then zero. Interestingly, from Lemma 1, we can see (17) with respect to the parameters of the tariff function be independent of stock levels, for all non-negative stock levels. We conjecture that for non-linear-quadratic models, the latter requirement is a stricter requirement than the credibility condition.
Under this restriction, the above maximization problem of Home amounts
The first-order condition is Squaring both sides, we have
Let us define
The rest of our task is to find λ > 0 that satisfies f (λ) = r 4 2c + r 
as is to be proved. || Remark 2 Using αa + βc = 0, we obtain from (17) the welfare of the Home as the leader when the stock is S :
The time path of the leader's welfare is then
Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium with the Exporter's Leadership
This section turns to the case in which Foreign is a leader. The detailed steps for computing the equilibrium made as brief as possible because the same derivation as that in the previous section applies to this case as well.
Supposing that Foreign chooses a feedback price rule p(S) = α * S+β * , Home's problem is
The HJB equation associated with this problem is
where V (S) is Home's value function and V S (S) ≡ dV (S)/dS. The first-order condition for maximizing the right-hand side yields Home's strategy
by assuming V (S) = AS 2 /2 + BS + C. Substituting this into the HJB equation, we have an identity in S:
Using the method of undetermined coefficients as in the last section, the three parameters can be determined:
Substituting these into (18) , the follower's strategy is
We see from this equation that α depends on α * and β depends on both α * and β * . In this sense, τ (S) is the follower's reaction function. Given p(S), the function τ (S) is determined. The resulting price that consumers in Home face can then be expressed as a function of the state variable S :
The function (23) has α * and β * as parameters. Now, as S approaches the threshold level S = a/c where economic efficiency would call for abandonment of the remaining stock X − S, intuitively in any sensible equilibrium the consumer's price should approach the choke price a. So definition 1 in the preceding section also applies here. We can now state:
Lemma 2 When Foreign is the leader, the credibility condition (15) is satisfied if and only if its choice of (α * , β * ) satisfies the condition that
Invoking that the dynamics of S with the linear strategies iṡ
the solution is obtained as
Based on these preparations, we now consider the exporting firm's problem. The instantaneous profit is
Substituting A, B and the solution of S into this expression and making some arrangements yield
Taking the integral at any (state, date) pair (S , t ) we have
which Foreign seeks to maximize by choosing α * and β * .
Recalling the argument in the previous section, the optimal pair (α * , β * ) that is derived by partially differentiating (25) Then, Foreign's problem at hand reduces to
The first-order condition is
which can not yield an explicit solution for α * . However, we can prove the unique existence of the solution by a transformation of variables.
Let us define γ = 4α * + r and square the above equation. Then, we have
which is equivalent to a cubic equation of γ:
r γ 2 + (4c + r) 2 + 2(4c + r)γ = 4γ 3 .
We must find γ > 0 that satisfies this condition. Defining
the rest of our task to find a positive γ which satisfies g(γ * ) = r(r + 4c) 2 .
Since g(0) = 0, g (0) < 0, lim γ→∞ g(γ) = ∞ and lim γ→−∞ g(γ) = −∞, we find three solutions to g(γ) = 0: γ = 0, γ 1 < 0 and γ 2 > 0. Therefore, we have arrived at:
Proposition 2 There exists a unique global Stackelberg equilibrium in linear strategies where Foreign (the exporting country) is a leader. As S approaches S, the tariff rate τ approaches zero, and the price approaches the choke price a.
Proof. We prove the second sentence in Proposition 2. 
Thus, we have arrived at Proposition 2. || Before moving to the next section, a useful result is stated and proved. 
where the last equality follows from the definition of S: S = (a−β −β * )/(α+ α * ). || Remark 3 Using the time consistency condition: aα * − c(a − β * ) = 0 , we obtain from (25) the welfare of Foreign as the leader when the stock is S :
The time path of the exporting leader's welfare is then
Numerical Results
Based on the results in the previous sections, this section seeks some implications of global Stackelberg equilibria for strategies and welfare in a comparison with the feedback Nash equilibrium. One difficulty is that the first-order condition for the optimization problem of leaders involves a cubic polynomial and hence we must resort to a numerical analysis. Tables 1 and 2 reports the equilibrium strategies in the Nash and two Stackelberg equilibria, and Tables 3 summarizes a welfare comparison. 17 Notice that, in all cases, the total sum of imports over time (in quantity terms, and undiscounted) is always S, which is just a confirmation of Lemma 3. So, policies only affect the time profile of imports and the time path of the consumer price p c but not the total imported stock. (Table 1) ( reduces the importing country's welfare because both consumer surplus and tariff revenue decrease. In order to deal with this welfare loss, the importing country will lower a tariff for import expansion, i.e., α is negative. On the other hand, a rise in marginal cost induced by an increase in S lowers the exporting country's profit. Hence, the exporting country will raise price for securing its profit, which makes α * positive.
Comparison of α and α *
When the importing country leads, it is bound by the time-consistent constraint β = −αa/c. It precommits to a faster rate of fall in tariff; α under its leadership is more negative than that in the Nash case (the absolute value of α increases). Observing this choice of the importer, the exporter optimally responds by setting a lower price earlier on (when S is still small), i.e., α * becomes higher while β * becomes lower. The leader thus manages to tilt the consumption path toward the present.
If, on the other hand, the exporting country is a leader, it is bound by the time-consistent constraint α * a = c(a − β * ). It chooses a lower α * , and this raises β * . Thus, its posted price is higher earlier on. Such a choice induces the follower (the importing country) to tax less and hence import demand and profits that accrue to the exporting country become larger.
5.2
Comparison of β and β * (Table 2) ( A first glance at them allows us to find that each country behaves more aggressively when it is a leader, i.e., the importing (resp. exporting) country chooses a higher tariff (resp. price) under its leadership. This is a natural consequence since each party aims for more resource rents by using a higher tariff or a higher price. As a result, the follower also takes a more aggressive response to the leader's precommitment. That is, β and β * of the leader are larger than those in the Nash case. (Table 3) ( Table 3 around here)
Welfare Comparison
We now compare welfare levels of each individual country and the world.
From the definition of the Stackelberg equilibrium, it is trivial that the leader improves its payoff relative to the feedback Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, the follower loses regardless of whether it is an exporting country or an importing country. The follower's welfare loss is large enough to dominate the leader's welfare gain, leading to a net welfare loss for the world. In other words, the presence of leadership leaves the world worse off than the Nash equilibrium. This result has a strong policy implication. As mentioned in the introduction, there is some evidence that supports the hypothesis that OPEC serves as a commitment device. Given this evidence and our result, such an oil cartel should be eliminated from the point of view of the world welfare. The same is true of the importing country. Although we have no empirics at hand that shows the precommitment behavior of the importing countries, such a behavior is harmful from the viewpoint of world welfare.
For this purpose, some kind of international organization or agreement that can play such a role may be called for. 18 (Table 4) ( Comparing Tables 3 and 4 , and paying special attention to the case in which Home is a leader, it gains more in the global solution than in the stagewise solution, starting from the Nash payoff. The reason is that the leader can attain a higher payoff by precommiting to its rule of strategies α and β. Therefore, the time path of τ (S) is
Comparison between Global and Stagewise Solutions

Time
where the last equality follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that assert that the tariff becomes zero in the steady state, i.e., αS + β = 0. In a similar way, the path of p(S) becomes
where the last equality uses α * S + β * = a in Propositions 1 and 2. Generally, the paths of welfare intersect. This is not surprising because at the time when the intersection occurs, the stock levels are not the same.
Concluding Remarks
We have developed a dynamic Stackelberg game model of a world market of an exhaustible resource to consider some welfare implications of leaderships.
After characterizing the two global Stackelberg equilibria in which either of the importing and exporting countries leads, we have shown that the world welfare is highest in the Nash equilibrium, namely, the presence of leaderships imparts a welfare loss to the world. This, in turn, implies that some kind of world organization or forum may be necessary to prevent the precommitment behavior of either party from the world welfare viewpoint.
While this paper offers some novel results, our model should admittedly be extended to relax a number of simplifying assumptions, e.g., linear demand, and a price-setting firm. It is part of our future research agenda to closely look at how our results are sensitive to the underlying assumptions. Total Nash 0.128831946a 2 0.257663892a 2 0.386495838a 2 Stackelberg (Home is leader) 0.275a 2 0.05a 2 0.325a 2 Stackelberg (Foreign is leader) 0.042548195a 2 0.307126431a 2 0.349674626a 2 Table 3 : Payoffs under S 0 = 0, r = 0.05 and c = 1
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